God only knows...

As meditators who have been led through his destructive arguments all the while denying everything ourselves, senses, the world, every object, person, and place we have ever seen or will see. We have followed Descartes letting go of everything leaving only a somewhat obscure notion of self. Then in a matter of a few lines God is proven. Something that people today and for all of time have debated and questioned without much resolution is just… proven. I feel like there must be an understanding here that I am not quite “getting”, I don’t feel that Descartes would make such a huge statement idly. My assumption is that, just like an impressionist painting, being so close and focusing on the details is not allowing me to see the big picture and truth. So, with that said here’s what I disagree with on the surface:

The nature or essence of an idea has demonstratable properties that are seen clearly and distinctly. Therefore these properties must be true. But then he states that “whatever is true is something” (CSM 45). I do not see how that follows. But at this point he is still talking about geometric shapes. His argument concerning God’s existence seems to be circular concerning these demonstratable properties. We know God exists because existing is a part of its nature. Descartes has linked the property of existence with God; therefore in trying to discover the proof of its existence we cannot separate it from God himself. I can agree that an essence can be true, but I do not see that existence necessarily follows. Also, there is the property of perfection, which God alone supposedly has. Descartes claims that perfection necessarily means existence, for a thing that does not exist is flawed (?). Hatfield discusses Gassendi’s counter to this, which is, “existing things equally share the perfection of existence” (Hatfield 219). This concept that if a thing exists then it is perfect because it has the unique property of simply being makes sense to me. Descartes may simply have a different notion of perfection, but it seems to me that something exists and thus is perfect or a thing does not exist and is thus not perfect. But then again, seeing as I have become this cynical thinking thing unsure of most things, I have forgotten about faith in favor of doubt and despite Descartes’ ability to “prove” God, it seems to me that faith is a big a crucial point he is missing.

Math Teacher/ Preacher

To discover truth we must look deeper into our own thoughts instead of thoughts of things outside us. So, now that we have abandoned the question for a brief moment on our ideas that come from the existence of things outside ourselves and move toward knowing where our own ideas come from. With so many of our ideas subject to doubt finding what is true becomes the Meditator’s mission. Descartes, almost romantically, explains that there are some ideas whose truth is, “so open and so much in harmony with my nature, that on first discovering them it seems that I am not so much learning something new as remembering what I knew before” (CSM 44). Hatfield explains this distinction in ideas as establishing what ideas are inventions or discoveries. When the truth of a thing is so clear and distinct in my mind it is as if it was a part of my nature, but not dependent on me. Up to this point we have not proven that we can know assuredly of the existence of anything outside ourselves. So, the things that we perceive as these clear and distinct truths in our mind do not necessarily need to exist for them to be true.

One of Descartes justifications for this is the fact that we do not will the ideas into our mind. Hatfield explains the difference between this unwilled idea of something with an immutable nature to the unwilled idea of something shown to us through the senses as the former does, “not fill her [the meditator’s] experience, as the heat of the fire might, but they compel recognition, or cognitive acknowledgment” (Hatfield 209). Descartes explains that these certain undeniable ideas have a “determinate nature” also called “essence” or “form” (CSM 45). This determinate nature can be demonstrated and has undeniable properties, which, “I now clearly recognize whether I want to or not” (CSM 45). The properties are in no way dependent on me, we assume by reason of doubt that they do not even necessarily exist outside of me, and I did not will the idea into my mind or invent it. Therefore in our thoughts we can have an idea of a thing without the use of any of the faculties of our mind, but once we clearly and distinctly perceive its properties the truth of the nature of the thing is undeniable. Descartes mostly uses the examples of simple maths and God as the examples of these innate ideas that are not of our own creation.

I did not will them. I did not invent them. They are not by my mind, but they are not from outside me either. So, my question here is whether the truth/essence/nature (?) of these ideas was already in my mind or if through discovering their properties I came to know them. I suppose that Descartes believes in the former- that these truths were already pre-stocked, in a sense, in our mind and it is just up to us to rediscover them. But then does that mean that our mind is already stamped with all truths therefore inward reflection in the discovery of truths is all that is necessary? Things may exist outside of us, but if our mind already has knowledge of all truths than the real world does not seem to hold anything unique, new, or valuable.

Father knows best

The will, also called freedom of choice, is the greatest perfection in us. It is not restricted in any way by God or any other force. In fact, Descartes’ almost puts the meditator on par with God concerning this freedom in the fact that “[God’s will] does not seem any greater than mine” (CSM 40). Descartes’ defines will as “our ability to do or not do something” (CSM 40). Ok, simple enough. Say, there is a pie cooling on the windowsill (I’m fairly certain this practice ended about the same time that “Father Knows Best” went off the air- but just work with me here). Complete freedom is our ability to choose to eat the pie or not eat the pie because there are no other options concerning the pie. Well, kind of. Being indifferent to the pie is also a freedom in itself, but a weak one. It is from this that Descartes’ two kinds of freedom are defined: by whether the will is used or not used in making a choice.

Warning! I’m about to go off topic in this paragraph. Please feel free to skip to the next one.
This concept of weak and strong freedom is, as I understand it, that if we are inclined to eat the pie (through clear understanding, divine grace, or natural knowledge) we are freer and if we are indifferent (no reason leading us one way or the other) this is the “lowest grade of freedom” (CSM 40). Wait… what? There are better or worse freedoms? But more than that, we are actually more free if we are moved by either inward or divine force to making a decision one way or the other? It seems to me that freedom is freedom and it can’t be varied especially if it is just in our knowledge or understanding of the thing we are making the choice on. In fact, just my gut reaction is that it is the exact opposite of what Descartes is claiming. We are freer to make decisions if we have no inclination either way. No bias, no “divine grace” pushing us, no inclinations- just us and our will. Yes, Father... I mean God... does know best because of his perfection, but I don't understand what freeom has to do with perfection. Freedom isn't correctly or incorrectly used, in my view. Freedom just is. But that’s beside the point…

So, there seems to be two major categories of freedom: the freedom of indifference and The Other freedom. It is this second kind of freedom that greatly confuses me. I don’t know exactly what to call it. I want to call it freedom of inclination, but this seems somewhat troubling. Hatfield specifically calls this second freedom “freedom in acting in accordance with our own will” or “freedom of spontaneity” (Hatfield 193). It is self-determinism. We are free, but at the same time our will has determined the right choice for us. So, we can be either have less freedom by not being having our free will determined or we can have more freedom by having our choices already made for us. Then my head explodes.

Rotten apple

What is it for an idea to resemble a thing? Resemble? Resemble… resemble… this mundane and commonplace word is suddenly foreign to me. Coming up with an adequate definition seems an impossible task. A copy. Like. Similar to. Well, that’s a start.

There is an apple (thing). There is a painting of an apple (an idea). The painting resembles the apple, but it seems to me that we cannot claim the reverse. An apple does not resemble a painting of an apple. They are indeed similar and alike, but because the painting is detached, secondary, and only created in reflection of the original object. It seems dependent on the existence of the original object. Even this idea doesn’t seem to hold water because what if a person is inspired by an apple and goes to create something that looks nothing like the apple, but has been colored, shaped, and abstracted to the point where an outside party would have no inkling as to the original inspiration of the work. Does it then still resemble the object? I am tempted to say that it resembles the object at least for the individual who created it. But if I look back at my original definitions it is neither a copy nor a likeness to the original. Therefore an abstract painting of an apple that is so distanced from the object of its inspiration as to be unrecognizable to any onlookers without some complicated and perhaps convoluted explanation by the creator it cannot be said to resemble the object. Then I would be calling the object false in its resemblance, calling the creator and the ideas of the creator false. I believe that ideas cannot be false therefore there must be something more to resemblance that stops me from denying that the abstract painting resembles the apple. The most I can come up with is that the painting (idea) resembles the apple (thing) in its essence or spirit. This holds true even if this essence is only seen by the creator, or has been greatly influence by other thoughts, ideas, images, emotions, volitions, judgments, and what have you in the creator’s mind. But my use of the apple as the thing and a painting as the idea could be closing me off to see this from a diferent light therefore I can only hope that my blog here resembles something semi-intelligible.

Naturally in the dark

Nature as teacher comes from the resemblance thesis (as it is called by Hatfield). It is one explanation for why we believe that things outside of us are the sources for ideas. We are lead to believe that nature is natural light, but what it really is natural impulse. The key difference here is that the light is indubitable while the impulse is fallible. Descartes explains that natural impulses (namely sensations) have already proven to lead us in the wrong direction in our judgment. Plus there is also the consideration that we make a judgment with the assumption that the idea was given to us through nature and natural light because we did not will it into our minds, but this does not prove that there are things outside us, which give birth to these ideas. What I thought was natural light revealed through impulse could have been “some other faculty not fully known to me, which produced these ideas without an assistance from external things” like dreaming (CSM 27).

Natural light is shown through the cogito. And, if I understand it correctly, may actually be the source that shows us that what nature teaches us cannot be trusted. Natural light must be made separate from the truth rule, or at least I believe them to be two separate things. Previous to this meditation natural light was brought up alongside reason and I assume that although not explicitly stated they are the same concept. Another question I have concerning natural light is that Descartes states that, “there cannot be another faculty both as trustworthy as the natural light and also capable of showing me that such things are not true.” (CSM 27). It is this “not” that makes me a little hesitant about what natural light exactly is. Could something we believe to be true because it has not been proven false by our natural light, still be false because it natural light has only as of yet not shown it to be false? Or is everything not shown to be false by natural light is necessarily true? Does distinct and clear perception play a role in deciding what is true once natural light has not proven something false? I may simply be confusing things more... which is something Descartes does to me, but hopefully there is a simple explanation that I have just missed.

So, 2 + 3 doesn’t equal Monkey?

The meditator begins Meditation 3 by realigning her thoughts with the cogito after a rousing frolic through the magical world of wax, now she is looking for certainty. Her method to gain knowledge of what she identifies as certain uses the cogito as a formula. This formula is made by stating:
1. I am a thing that thinks
2. I came up with that through clear and distinct perception
4. “whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true.” (CSM 24)
Don’t worry I can count. I skipped the three because I feel like there is something missing. Hatfield states that 3 is “Clear and distinct perception would not be sufficient to yield such knowledge if it was in an way fallible” (144). But I feel that this doesn’t quite meet the criteria for truth. Descartes then brings the deceiving-god argument back into play. In the first meditation the deceiving-god hypothesis made meditator doubt simple and straightforward truths, but now Descartes states that there are three things safe from deceiving god: I am something, I exist, simple math (or arithmetic and geometry). Concerning what I called simple maths, I believe Descartes means anything simple without an inherent contradiction. But doesn’t the third point counter the idea that god can make us doubt simples? Now, math has been brought back as truth. So, my previous statement in my other blog that “we could conceivably convince ourselves that 2 + 3 = Monkey” is now false. I was reluctant before to believe that such a simple statement of fact that 2 + 3 =5 could be false, yet I doubted because that’s where the meditation led me. Now it seems I was foolish to do that. Descartes reason for this is that slight and metaphysical doubt should not stop the meditator from dwelling on deceiving god as cause for doubt and that there is no cause to think there is a deceiving god, or whether there is a god at all. Is that a kind of a copout or did I miss something? So, for now: it is the truth that 2 + 3 does = 5, but I am still not certain of this fact.

Mind your own beeswax

A piece of wax seems so simple. The residual taste of honey, a sweet fragrance, yellowish appearance, sticky and solid: that’s all there is to it, no source of complication just thoughts of buzzing bees and honey spread on toast. Oh how naïve of me. In this passage Descartes uses the piece of wax as an example that will show us two important and crucial aspects key in establishing truth: the true power of perception and what it means to be human. Suddenly this simple substance has become the seed of something much bigger.

Descartes leads the meditator to establish how best to perceive and understand the properties and nature of an object. First he grants her the senses, which reveal color, taste, texture, etc. He tears these sense-based conclusions down when the wax is melted and no longer contains the formerly held features. So, what is left of the nature of wax outside of that which is perceived by our senses is that it is extendable, flexible, and changeable. But how do we come to this knowledge? Even with the use of our imagination we cannot know the wax in all its infinite possible shapes it could be formed into. Thus, the senses and our imagination are not adequate in the perception of the nature of wax. It is the mind that reveals to us the true nature of wax. This use of the mind in discovering nature is “mental scrutiny” and the mind’s use of the intellect in creating an understanding of a thing.

This new idea of mental scrutiny, use of the intellect, and perceiving objects through understanding brings the meditator to a more important understanding, which is how the mind is better known than a body. It is this, although from a slightly different angle, that reaffirms the cogito in our knowledge of our own existence. For our experimentation with the wax and its nature could be false and does not matter. What the exploration of the wax does do is aid us in better knowing our own mind. And it is this use of our intellect and mind to perceive the nature and understanding of a thing that separates us from animals.

I am left with a slight buzzing in my ears for I am not qute sure about all of Descartes argument. One of the quesitons I have with these two conclusions is that how are we sure that our perception of the wax previous and post-melting is enough evidence to discount the senses and imagination all together. Couldn’t it be that our sense-perception and imagination contain the knowledge of wax when it was hard and after it is melted? Our senses do not perceive things as one image alone. Our imagination and senses could contain the knowledge that wax can change from one form to another. So this idea that wax is hard, sweet smelling, etc. and then when it is liquid and no longer smells the same are contained in the same knowledge. It is if it is not heated it is like this and if it is heated it is like this. Or is this ability to grasp shifting states of objects part of the mind and not a resource of our sense and imagination? I don’t know if that quite makes sense, but it seems slightly unclear to me. What is judgment’s role in determining the nature of things for we may judge things incorrectly and therefore wouldn’t the conclusion from these judgments be incorrect?